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The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US mili-
tary engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the 
Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of Euro-
pean security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO 
member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges 
in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more 
in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the 
activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various 
limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in 
a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on 
the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilat-
eral relations between Washington and Moscow. 
Obama’s policy towards Russia before 
the annexation of Crimea
When president Barack Obama took office in 
January 2009, he was an advocate of rapproche-
ment with Russia. Relations with Moscow were 
tense in the aftermath of his predecessor’s 
eight years in power, mainly because of the 
USA’s toppling of the Russia-friendly regime of 
Saddam Hussain in Iraq and its support for the 
so-called colour revolutions in the post-Soviet 
area, as well as due to the Russian intervention 
in Georgia and the clashes over the US missile 
defence programme in Europe. The new open-
ing in relations with Moscow was intended to 
help Obama reach his strategic objectives with 
regard to the reduction of nuclear arsenals, and 
was in line with his broader concept of involving 
other world powers to a greater extent in the 
resolution of such problems as the conflict in 
the Middle East or the fight against terrorism. 
Moreover, warmer relations with Russia would 
create a favourable context for a further down-
sizing of the US military presence in Europe. 
Finally, the US administration considered the then 
president Dmitry Medvedev, who had pledged 
to speed up the modernisation of Russia and 
had a ‘pro-Western’ image, to be more willing 
to co-operate than Vladimir Putin had been.
The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the White House 
achieved some of Obama’s objectives. In par-
ticular, it led to the signature of the new START 
treaty, it managed to put more international 
pressure on Iran over its nuclear programme, 
and it led to the adoption of a UN Securi-
ty Council resolution critical of North Korea. 
While Moscow did not manage to fully dis-
suade Washington from deploying elements of 
its missile defence system in Europe, the pro-
gramme was scaled down and re-organised. 
However, starting from 2011, a rift between 
the two countries emerged over their respec-
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tive assessments of the Arab Spring. Washing-
ton backed the pro-democratic protests, while 
Moscow saw them as illegal coups analogous 
to the colour revolutions. The ‘reset’ policy 
ended with the 2012 presidential elections in 
Russia, which brought Vladimir Putin back to 
the Kremlin as president and was followed 
by mounting repression against the Russian 
opposition. Since that moment, US-Russia re-
lations started to deteriorate again, further ex-
acerbated by Russia’s decision to grant asylum 
to the former National Security Agency (NSA) 
contractor Edward Snowden. 
The Crimea watershed 
and cautious reactions
For the United States, the annexation of Crimea 
and Russia’s intervention in eastern Ukraine 
were unexpected and became a pivotal point 
for the US elite’s perceptions of European secu-
rity. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington 
had regarded Europe as a sphere of growing 
stability. Facing the violation of Ukraine’s ter-
ritorial integrity, Russia’s ever higher defence 
spending and the progressing modernisation 
of the Russian army, coupled with the Krem-
lin’s openly anti-Western rhetoric, the Unit-
ed States started to view Russian aggression 
against a state on NATO’s eastern flank as 
a potential eventuality. While Russia remains 
an important international actor whom the 
United States cannot ignore, the way it is per-
ceived in Washington has changed radically. 
The US National Security Strategy published in 
February 2015 identifies Russia’s aggressive pol-
icy as one of the major challenges to European 
security.1 This is a telling change in comparison 
to the 2010 strategy document which identified 
Russia primarily as an emerging economy and 
a partner in the disarmament efforts.2 
Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, the US policy on European security has 
been suspended between two contradictory 
objectives. On the one hand, in the wake of the 
annexation of Crimea it had become necessary 
to reassure its Central European allies that the 
United States continued to guarantee the Euro-
pean security architecture. On the other hand, 
the United States wishes to pursue this policy 
at the lowest possible cost, not least because 
of the annual problems in reaching consensus 
on the budget between the Democratic presi-
dent and the Republican-dominated Congress. 
Moreover, Washington also needs to take Russia 
into account as a player with whom the United 
States may have to co-operate in other regions 
of the world, for instance in the Middle East. 
Therefore, the policy of strengthening NATO’s 
eastern flank to some extent depends on the 
broader relations between the United States 
and Russia. Moreover, the position of those Eu-
ropean allies who are cautious about escalat-
ing tensions with Russia (such as Germany3 or 
France) is also important for the White House. 
The US foreign and security policy is co-deter-
mined by a number of decision-making centres. 
However, during Obama’s term as president his 
inner circle, and especially the people around 
1 US National Security Strategy 2015, February 2015, Stra-
tegic Theater Transformation. 
2 US National Security Strategy 2010, May 2010, Strategic 
Theater Transformation. 
3 See: Justyna Gotkowska, Dużo reasekuracji, mniej od-
straszania – Niemcy wobec wzmacniania wschodniej 
flanki NATO, Komentarze OSW, 5.07.2016, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2016-07-05/
duzo - r e a s e k u ra c j i - mn i e j - o ds t r a s z an i a - n i e m -
cy-wobec-wzmacniania
For the United States, the annexation 
of Crimea and Russia’s intervention in 
eastern Ukraine were unexpected and 
became a pivotal point for the US elite’s 
perceptions of European security.
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the National Security Council, including nation-
al security advisor Susan Rice and her deputy 
Benjamin Rhodes, have played a decisive role 
in this regard. It is a group of moderates who 
see the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as one of the 
challenges that the United States is facing, and 
consider Russia as a partner in solving other 
conflicts and crises in the world. For this rea-
son, they are wary of escalating the conflict 
with Moscow by, for instance, providing lethal 
weapons to Ukraine or excessively reinforcing 
the Alliance’s eastern flank. The Department 
of Defense leadership and the current defence 
secretary Ashton Carter present a more hawk-
ish stance. For this group, an increasingly ag-
gressive Russia currently poses one of the most 
serious challenges to the international order, 
requiring a firm reaction from the US, which 
should also include stepping up the military 
presence on NATO’s eastern flank. This attitude 
is largely shared by representatives of the US 
military, especially the US Army and the troops 
deployed in Europe. The current Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, general Curtis Scaparrot-
ti, and his predecessor, general Philip Breed-
love, have both argued for more decisive ac-
tion, which in their view should include arming 
Ukraine and reinforcing the Alliance’s collective 
defence. For the officers in the land forces the 
mounting threat from Russia also serves as an 
argument for increasing the budget of this ser-
vice branch, which has been losing relative sig-
nificance as the Pacific region, and hence, the 
Air Force and the Navy, have gained more sig-
nificance in the US security strategy.4
4 Mark Perry, The U.S. Army’s war over Russia, Politico, 
12.05.2016, Strategic Theater Transformation.
US military involvement in Europe 
after 2014 
For the last three years, the United States has 
been stepping up efforts to enhance the Alli-
ance’s interoperability and boost the allies’ de-
fence capabilities. The size of the US presence 
in the eastern flank countries is unprecedented 
and marks the first build-up of US forces in Eu-
rope on such a scale since the end of the Cold 
War. However, it is still insufficient to guaran-
tee effective defence in the event of a poten-
tial conflict with Russia. The measures taken 
by the US to enhance European security since 
2014 seem to amount to a series of signals sent 
to Moscow, rather than an effective deterrence 
strategy, which would impose a much greater 
financial cost. 
The reassurance of US allies in Europe is fi-
nanced under the European Reassurance Initi-
ative (ERI), announced by Obama in June 2014. 
It allocates a special envelope of funding in the 
Department of Defence budget to expenses re-
lated to military activity in Europe (e.g. more 
frequent drills, modernisation of military equip-
ment and infrastructures). The ERI is part of the 
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), a sec-
tion in the Pentagon budget devoted to foreign 
operations. If Congress fails to adopt the feder-
al budget within due time, this section is sub-
ject to so-called sequestration, i.e. automatic 
cuts.5 The ERI budget is planned year-by-year; 
US$985 million has been allocated to ERI in the 
2015 US defence budget. The new funding has 
been earmarked primarily for stepping up US 
military presence, investments in infrastructure 
in the allied states and the storage of military 
equipment in Europe. Funds have also been 
earmarked for increasing the number and fre-
quency of military drills with allied forces, and 
assistance to partner countries (e.g. Georgia). 
5 ‘Sequestration’ means automatic cuts in public spend-
ing in the event that the budget for the year that is be-
ginning is not passed by Congress and endorsed by the 
President. 
The measures taken by the US to en-
hance European security since 2014 
seem to amount to a series of signals 
sent to Moscow.
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The ERI has been extended for the fiscal year 
2016 with a budget of US$789 million,6 in 
which a larger portion than in the year before 
has been earmarked for increasing the US mili-
tary presence on the eastern flank. In the draft 
2017 budget proposed by the Department of 
Defense, ERI spending is to increase four-fold 
to US$3.4 billion. This surge is a reaction to the 
lack of progress in the implementation of the 
Minsk accords and the growing aggressiveness 
of Russia.
The reinforcement of the eastern flank mainly 
consists in more frequent joint drills, as well as 
a rotational presence of small US armed units. 
All US activities aimed at supporting the Euro-
pean allies have been part of operation Atlan-
tic Resolve since April 2014. Atlantic resolve is 
a common heading for the activities of all the 
service branches, i.e. the Army, the Navy, the 
Air Force and the Marine Corps. As far as land 
force operations are concerned, Washington’s 
activities have been centred on augmenting the 
forces already stationed in Europe and partly 
moving them to the eastern flank states. Since 
April 2014, four US Army companies have been 
involved in exercises in Poland and the Baltic 
states on a rotational basis. Next year they will 
be joined by a heavy brigade redeployed from 
US territory, which will take part in exercises in 
Poland, the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria. 
Moreover, the United States will be the frame-
work nation in charge of one of the four bat-
talion combat groups (of around 800 to 1000 
soldiers), the deployment of which in Poland 
and the Baltic states has just been announced 
at the NATO summit in Warsaw.7 In December 
2015 Washington started deploying military 
6 The budget for the fiscal year 2015 (from 1.10.2014 to 
1.10.2015) is higher than for the year 2016 mainly be-
cause of the need to finance measures implemented be-
fore October 2014, including assistance to the Ukrainian 
army.
7 NATO Chief: 4 Battalions Going to Baltic States, Po-
land, ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/International/
wireStory/nato-chief-alliance-agree-week-deploy-bat-
talions-baltic-39812252
equipment on the eastern flank for the units 
taking part in the rotational drills in Poland, 
the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania (the 
European Activity Set, EAS). The EAS involves 
Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles 
and Paladin self-propelled howitzers. On top of 
that, the plans for 2017 envisage setting up mil-
itary depots in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany with arms and military equipment 
for an additional brigade (the Armed Preposi-
tion Stockpile, APS) which may be airlifted to 
Europe and reach combat readiness at much 
shorter notice.8 The United States has also 
stepped up its involvement in air force drills. 
In August 2015, four fifth-generation F-22 
fighters were flown to Europe (the US air base 
in Spangdahlem, Germany) for the first time to 
take part in joint exercises.9 A-10 close air sup-
port aircraft and F-15 fighters, usually number-
ing 12 aircraft, also regularly take part in drills 
in the eastern flank states as part of the Theater 
Security Package mission. As far as the Navy is 
concerned, the US efforts seem relatively mod-
est in comparison – the most important activity 
consists of regular patrols by US warships from 
the naval base in Rota, Spain, in the Baltic and 
the Black Sea regions as part of the AEGIS mis-
sile defence system. 
8 Department of Defense, Eucom Announces Europe-
an Reassurance Initiative Implementation Plan, http://
www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/708271/
eucom-announces-european-reassurance-initiative-im-
plementation-plan
9 L. Seligman, US F-22s Arrive In Europe, Defense-
News, 31.08.2015, http://www.defensenews.com/
story/defense/air-space/2015/08/28/us-f-22s-arrive-eu-
rope/71315590/
The surge in ERI spending is a reaction to 
the lack of progress in the implementa-
tion of the Minsk accords and the grow-
ing aggressiveness of Russia.
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NATO’s eastern flank as seen 
from Washington
The United States’ military reaction to the in-
creased threat from Russia has been centred on 
those NATO states which have been most vocal 
in calling for a reinforcement of their military 
potential, i.e. the Baltic states, Poland, Romania 
and Bulgaria. They have benefited most from 
the increased frequency of joint drills and the 
modernisation of military infrastructure. How-
ever, it was not just because of their expressly 
formulated expectations, but also because of 
their geographic location that the allies in the 
Baltic and the Black Sea regions received much 
more support than the Czech Republic, Slovakia 
or Hungary. The ERI investments, on the other 
hand, have mostly benefited Germany, because 
of the US infrastructure already existing there. 
From the point of view of the United States, the 
geopolitical significance of the Nordic-Baltic 
region is growing. Since 2014, the region has 
been seen as an area of potential conflict be-
tween Russia on the one hand, and the United 
States’ NATO allies (Poland and the Baltic states) 
or its partners outside the Alliance (Sweden and 
Finland) on the other.10 The Baltic states and Po-
land have benefited most from operation At-
lantic Resolve. Land force companies have been 
present in their territories on a rotational basis 
since April 2014. The US has organised the an-
nual Saber Strike and Swift Response drills, the 
objective of which has been inter alia to test the 
movement of troops within NATO territory and 
the deployment of troops from the USA. Some 
image-building activities have also taken place, 
such as the Dragoon Ride between the Baltic 
states and Germany, which serves to reassure 
not just the governments, but also the general 
public in the allied states. The United States has 
10 J. Gotkowska, P. Szymański, Pro-American non-align-
ment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military 
co-operation with the United States, OSW Commen-
tary, April 2016, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2016-04-01/pro-american-non-align-
ment-sweden-and-finland-develop-closer
also stepped up its involvement in the national 
drills of their allies, such as Poland’s Anakon-
da-16 in which nearly 14 thousand US troops 
took part. The US Air Force, too, has been more 
active in the region. The United States has been 
providing more air support as part of the AV-
DET mission in Poland11 and in 2014, in direct 
response to the annexation of Crimea, it scaled 
up its involvement in the Baltic Air Policing 
(BAP), i.e. the constant air patrols over the Bal-
tic states, conducted by the air forces of NATO 
states.12 The Navy, meanwhile, has played 
a relatively small role in the reassurance efforts. 
Since 2015, one of the four Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers stationed at the naval base in Rota, 
Spain, has been regularly patrolling the Baltic. 
The warships patrol the sea and also serve im-
age-building purposes as they call at ports in 
the allied states. Furthermore, the United States 
has invested in military infrastructures in the re-
gion. For instance, the air bases in Łask (Poland), 
Ämari (Estonia), Lielvārde (Latvia) and Šiauliai 
(Lithuania) have been overhauled and extended 
since 2014.13 Likewise, the firing ranges in Tapa 
(Estonia), Ādaži (Lativa) and Rukla (Lithuania) 
have been modernised and will probably serve 
as storage sites for US military equipment. 
11 Aviation Detachment (AVDET) has taken place since 
2012 and is about regular US Air Force drills on Polish 
territory. In May 2014 the mission was expanded – six 
US F-16 fighters were moved to the base in Łask from 
Spangdahlem, Germany.
12 Between January and April 2014 the USA stepped up its 
involvement in the mission from 4 to 10 F-16 fighters.
13 EUCOM, EUCOM provides an update on the European 
Reassurance Initiative, 20.04.2015, http://www.eucom.
mil/media-library/article/33026/eucom-provides-up-
date-on-the-european-reassurance-initiative
The United States’ military reaction to the 
increased threat from Russia has been 
centred on those NATO states which 
have been most vocal in calling for a re-
inforcement of their military potential.
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The US has also co-financed purchases of US 
arms and military equipment by the Baltic 
states.14 As an indirect form of support, the 
eastern flank countries have been allowed to 
buy state-of-the-art US military equipment, 
such as the JASSM cruise missiles.15 
The Black Sea region was the object of US 
interest long before the Russian-Ukrainian 
war. Because of their geographic location, Ro-
mania and Bulgaria have been treated as im-
portant partners for the US operations in the 
Middle East, Central Asia and the South Cau-
casus. The two countries received additional 
reinforcement after the annexation of Crimea 
and the change of the geostrategic situation 
in the Black Sea region. However, that support 
was smaller than in the case of the Baltic states 
and Poland because of the prior presence of US 
forces in their territories, and consisted mainly 
in closer co-operation between the air and navy 
forces. After 2014, 175 additional soldiers rein-
forced the Black Sea Rotational Force stationed 
at the Mihail Kogălniceanu base in Romania. 
This force was created in 2010 as a 250-strong 
unit of US Marine Corps with the purpose of 
strengthening allied ties with Romania and Bul-
garia in view of the two countries’ support for 
the US involvement in the Middle East and Afri-
ca. Since 2003, Romanian and Bulgarian bases 
have been used as a redeployment point for the 
US Army. Moreover, US military drills such as 
Saber Junction or Swift Response have partly 
taken place in Romania. After 2014, the US Air 
14 For example, Javelin anti-tank systems in the case of 
Estonia or Harris Falcon III radio stations in the case of 
Lithuania.
15 JASSM missiles have been ordered by Poland and Fin-
land. Before they were only available to Australia.
Force started to hold regular exercises in the 
territory of Bulgaria and Romania – these ex-
ercises have involved A-10 close air support air-
craft and F-15 fighters (Theater Security Pack-
age), F-16 fighters, KC-135 refuelling aircraft as 
well as F-22 fighters (on one occasion so far). 
The US Navy undertook similar activities on the 
Black Sea as it did on the Baltic after 2014. Fol-
lowing the annexation of Crimea, US warships 
stationed at the Rota base in Spain started to 
patrol the Black Sea on a regular basis. The 
United States has also invested in the moderni-
sation and extension of military bases including 
Graf Ignatevo (Bulgaria), Câmpia Turzii and Mi-
hail Kogălniceanu (Romania).
The Central European region has received 
relatively little attention in the US plans to 
strengthen the NATO eastern flank (with the 
exception of Poland, treated as part of the Nor-
dic-Baltic region). The United States realises 
that – owing to their geographic location – the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have dif-
ferent perceptions of threats. These states did 
not call for a reinforced US military presence in 
Europe in the wake of 2014, sometimes even 
criticising the idea, although in the end they 
accepted the consensus within NATO. Despite 
Washington’s critical view of Viktor Orbán’s 
policy, Hungary has been the Central European 
ally with which the United States has co-oper-
ated most closely. 
Outlook for the future
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been 
pivotal for the way the US views European se-
curity. Nevertheless, US military involvement on 
NATO’s eastern flank still mainly serves politi-
cal rather than military purposes. It is intended 
to have an impact  on its image and reassure 
the allies that the collective defence commit-
ments remain valid. The US progresses step by 
step. While the scale of operations has been 
increasing, they still barely address the mili-
tary imbalance between the allies on NATO’s 
US military involvement on NATO’s east-
ern flank still mainly serves political 
rather than military purposes.
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eastern flank and the Russian Federation.16 The 
unprecedented activity of US armed forces in 
the countries on the Baltic and the Black Sea 
(especially once the regularly rotating brigade 
is deployed in 2017) will contribute to strength-
ening the deterrence potential. If the US contin-
ues to step up its military engagement on the 
eastern flank, it will use the rotational presence 
formula. The United States is unlikely to set up 
permanent military bases in the region. Mos-
cow and the Western capitals would see that 
as excessively provocative. Moreover, the ex-
pert community in the United States has been 
increasingly sceptical about creating large, per-
manent oversees bases.17
Because the build-up of US military involvement 
in Europe depends on the annual adoption of 
the ERI budget, the United States’ current ac-
tivities are not based on any long-term plan to 
step up America’s own military engagement or 
considerably boost the defence capacity of al-
lies on the eastern flank. The current proposal 
to increase the ERI funding several-fold in the 
fiscal year 2017 is probably the last major move 
as far as the Obama administration’s Europe-
an policy is concerned. In the coming years the 
ERI may face cuts as part of the annual budget 
negotiations in Washington. Should there be 
a thaw in the relations between Washington 
and Moscow, security matters in Central and 
Eastern Europe will be among the first areas in 
which Russia will expect concessions. Moreo-
ver, there is a consensus among US politicians 
that the European states spend disproportion-
ately little on defence, given their development 
level, and should be pressured to take on more 
16 David A. Shlapak, Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing De-
terrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, RAND Corporation, 
February 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_re-
ports/RR1253.html
17 Objectives formulated e.g. in: US European Command, Stra-
tegic Theater Transformation, January 2005, http://web.
archive.org/web/20070204141322/; http://www.eucom.
mil/english/Transformation/Transform_Blue.asp
responsibility for their own security.18 The on-
going campaign ahead of the US presidential 
election proves that this negative view of the 
European allies may play an increasingly impor-
tant role in the public debate in the US.
This year’s presidential election will be crucial 
for the future of US military involvement in 
Europe. The pre-election debate this time has 
been less focused on the economy than in 2008 
or 2012, and more attention has been paid to 
topics related to foreign and security policy 
(especially terrorism). The scale of differences 
between the Democratic and Republican can-
didates as far as foreign policy is concerned is 
the largest in decades, also with regard to Eu-
ropean security or the relations with the Rus-
sian Federation. Hillary Clinton is an advocate 
of maintaining and strengthening NATO in its 
current form. Even though she was one of the 
authors of the policy of ‘reset’ in the relations 
with Russia, she has been very critical of the 
Kremlin’s policy since the outbreak of the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian conflict. Donald Trump, on the 
other hand, has repeatedly decried the USA’s 
European allies for ‘exploiting’ Washington to 
maintain their security at a low cost. In his first 
foreign policy speech the Republican candidate 
called NATO ‘obsolete’ and suggested that its 
objectives should be defined anew. He has also 
declared that he is willing to ease tensions with 
Moscow, suggesting negotiations with Russia 
and pointing to shared experiences, such as the 
terror threat.
18 Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, The Atlantic, 
April 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar-
chive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/
This year’s presidential election will 
be crucial for the future of US military 
involvement in Europe.
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While Russia’s increasingly aggressive posturing 
has led to a reversal of the US policy of scal-
ing down military involvement in Europe, the 
Old Continent nonetheless remains a less im-
portant theatre than Eastern Asia or the Middle 
East. This is not likely to change, unless there 
is a sudden escalation of the Russian-Ukraini-
an conflict or Russia targets a NATO member 
directly. In the wake of 2014, the United States 
has not changed its strategic choice to pivot to-
wards the Pacific, motivated by China’s increas-
ingly assertive policies and the threat posed by 
its growing military potential to the US allies in 
the Pacific region. The US elite views the rise of 
China’s power as the most important challenge 
to the United States’ international hegemony. 
The focus on Asia is reflected in the direction of 
innovations in the US defence sector and in the 
most popular US strategic concepts (e.g. AirSea 
Battle).19 Even after the additional brigade is 
deployed in Europe, the US will still have fewer 
troops in Europe than it has in the territories 
of the Asian allies. If tensions continue to rise 
between the United States and China (e.g. over 
the islands in the South China Sea or Taiwan), 
this disproportion will probably deepen. The 
Middle East is also seen in the United States 
as a source of threats more serious than those 
faced by Europe. While the size of US forces in 
the region has decreased considerably during 
president Barack Obama’s term, the US has 
continued to bear the high financial burden of 
its involvement in the Middle East, including its 
assistance to Israel, or participation in the in-
ternational coalition fighting the Islamic State. 
19 AirSea Battle. Service Collaboration to Address An-
ti-Access&Area Denial Challenges, US Department of 
Defense, May 2013, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/
Documents/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summa-
ry-May-2013.pdf
APPENDICES
Appendix 1. US troops deployed in Europe by service branch and selected major units 
(as of June 2016).20
The United States has been scaling down its military presence in Europe since the end of the Cold 
War. At the peak post-War moment, in 1952, there were around 450,000 US soldiers stationed in 
Europe. In the years 1990–1993 the US Army presence in Europe decreased from 213,000 soldiers 
to 122,000 soldiers.21 The personnel reductions ended in October 2012 when the 172th brigade 
stationed in Baumholder, Germany, was disbanded. Currently around 62,000 soldiers, representing 
different service branches, serve under the US European Command.
20 Source: U.S. Military Presence in Europe (1945-2016), U.S. European Command, 26.05.2016, http://www.eucom.mil/me-
dia-library/document/35220/u-s-military-presence-in-europe-fact-sheet, 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength, The Her-
itage Foundation, http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/assessments/operating-environment/europe/ MCoE Supple-
mental Manual 3-90 – Force Structure Reference Data, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/other/
msm3-90_2012.pdf, M. Tan, Army restructures CAB in Germany, cuts 1,900 troop jobs, Army Times, April 2015, http://
www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/04/29/army-restructures-12th-combat-aviation-brigade/26587469/
21 http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/chapter/op-environment/europe/
9OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 216
Service branch Number of troops Largest units (name, place of deployment, 
number of soldiers, selected weapons)
US Army ~25,000 2nd Cavalry Regiment (Vilseck, Germany) 
around 4,500 troops 
among others: Stryker armoured fighting vehicles 
(around 300), M777 howitzers
173rd Airborne Brigade (Vicenza, Italy)
around 4,400 troops 
M119 howitzers (x 2), M777 howitzer (x 1) 
among other weapons
12th Combat Aviation Brigade (Katterbach, Germany) 
around 1,300 troops 
among others: AH-64, UH-60, CH-47 helicopters
Navy and Marine Corps ~8,500 among others: Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (x 4), 
command ship (x 1) 
Air Force ~28,000 31st Fighter Wing (Aviano, Italy) 
no data 
among others: F-16 fighters (x 48)
48th Fighter Wing (Lakenheath, UK) 
no data 
among others: F-15 fighters (x 72)
52nd Fighter Wing (Spangdahlem, Germany) 
no data 
among others: F-16 fighters (x 24)
Appendix 2. Involvement of US forces in selected exercises and missions in Europe
Exercise 2013 2014 2015 2016
Saber 
Strike
580 troops 380 troops
8 x F-16 fighter
1 x B-52 bomber
Bradley infantry fi-
ghting vehicles 
Stryker armoured 
fighting vehicles
Around 700 troops
3 B-52 bombers
2 B-2 bombers
4 KC-135 refuelling 
aircraft
C-17 and C-130 
transport aircraft, 
8 A-10 close air support 
aircraft
16 F-16 fighters
AH-64 Apache 
helicopters
Abrams tanks
Stryker armoured 
fighting vehicles 
M119A3 light howitzers
Around 2,000 troops
1 B-52 bomber, 
2 HH-60 helicopters
5 AH-64 helicopters 
A-10 close air support 
aircraft 
HIMARS multiple rocket 
launchers
M777 howitzers
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Exercise 2013 2014 2015 2016
Baltops No data on 
the number 
of troops
1 Blue Ridge-c-
lass command 
ship (USS Mount 
Whitney)
1 B-52 bomber 
1300 troops
1 Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer 
(USS Oscar Austin)
1 KC-135 refuelling 
aircraft
670 troops 
1 landing craft 
(USS San Antonio)
4 KC-135 refuelling 
aircraft
14 F-16 fighters
3 B-52 bombers
around 700 troops
1 command ship 
(USS Mount Whitney)
4 KC-135 refuelling 
aircraft
20 F-16 fighters
2 B-52 bombers
Saber 
Junction
- 2500 troops
14 C-130 transport 
aircraft
no data Around 1000 troops
Aviation 
Detachment 
(AVDET)
15.02.-9.03. 
3 C-130 trans-
port aircraft 
(Powidz, Poland)
31.03.-12.04. 
3 C-130 transport 
aircraft (Powidz)
23.03.-17.04. 
4 C-130 transport 
aircraft (Powidz)
29.02.-25.03. 
4 C-130 transport aircraft 
(Powidz)
6-24.05. 
6 F-16 fighters 
(Łask, Poland)
01.05.-[?] 
6 F-16 fighters (Łask)
06.06.-20.06. 
20 F-16 fighters
12-25.07. 
6 F-16 fighters 
(Łask)
2-18.06. 
18 F-16 fighters 
(Łask) 
2-30.06. 
8 F-16 fighters (Łask)
15-25.10. 
3 C-130 trans-
port aircraft 
(Powidz)
1.07.-31.08. 
3 C-130 transport 
aircraft (Powidz, 
Poland)
12.10.-6.11. 
3 C-130 transport 
aircraft (Powidz)
4.09.-8.10. 
7 F-16 fighters (Łask)
15-31.10. 
2 C-130 transport 
aircraft (Powidz)
Theater 
Security 
Package
- - 27.03.-30.06. 
12 F-15 fighters 
(Leeuwarden, Nether-
lands/Graf Ignatevo, 
Bulgaria)
01.04.-30.09. 
12 F-15 fighters 
(Keflavík, Iceland/
Leeuwarden, 
Netherlands)
30.03.-30.06. 
12 A-10 close air sup-
port aircraft (Câmpia 
Turzii, Romania/Graf 
Ignatevo) 
25.06.-30.07. 
12 A-10 close air sup-
port aircraft 
(Łask, Poland)
23.06.-30.09. 
12 F-15 fighters 
(Câmpia Turzii)
IX-XII 12 A-10 close air 
support aircraft 
(Ämari, Estonia/
Kecskemét, Hungary/
Câmpia Turzii)
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Exercise 2013 2014 2015 2016
Baltic 
Air 
Policing
- I-III 
4 F-15 fighters 
(Šiaulē, Lithuania)
- -
III-IV 
10 F-15 fighters 
(Šiaulē)
Appendix 3. Spending on European Reassurance Initiative in the years 2015–2017 (US$ million)22
Fiscal year 2015 Fiscal year 2016 Fiscal year 2017*
Stepped-up presence 423.1 471.4 1 049.8
Additional exercises and training 40.6 108.4 163.1
Infrastructure investments 196.5 89.1 217.4
Storage of military equipment 136.1 57.8 1 903.9
Defence capacity building in partner states 13.7 62.6 85.5
Transfer fund (support for the governments 
of Ukraine and the Baltic states)
175 - -
Total 985 789,3 3 419,7
* planned spending not yet approved by Congress
22 Source: http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_ERI_J-Book.pdf
